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Abstract
We explore the relationship between inequality and demand structure
in an endogenous growth model where consumers expand consumption
along a hierarchy of needs and desires. The consumption hierarchy is
captured by non-homothetic preferences implying that the shape of the
demand curves for various goods depends on the distribution of income.
This setting enables us to study a mechanism that so far has been largely
neglected in the literature: the role that inequality plays for the prices that
innovators can charge and the corresponding quantities that innovators
can sell. Thus, the inﬂuence of inequality on innovation incentive and
growth can be analyzed.
We get the following results: (i) Changes in inequality aﬀect the ag-
gregate price structure and there may be market exclusion of the poor
due to high prices. (ii) If there is exclusion, higher inequality tends to
increase growth because the proﬁt share increases. However, higher in-
equality due to a bigger group of poor people may reduce growth. (iii)
If the innovators always sell to the whole population, inequality has an
unambigously negative impact on growth. Prices are then determined by
the willingness to pay of the poor. An even more egalitarian distribution
allows the monopolist to set higher prices and earn higher proﬁts as the
poor are the ’critical’ consumers that determine demand at the extensive
margin.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies the impact of hierarchic preferences on distribution and
growth. When consumers have hierarchic preferences the structure of demand
is aﬀected by the distribution of income. Poor people concentrate most of their
expenditures on basic needs, whereas richer people direct their expenditures to
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1more luxurious goods. The empirical relevance of a hierarchic structure of de-
mand is documented by ’Engel’s law’, one of the most robust empirical ﬁndings
in economics. According to Engel’s law the expenditure share for food decreases
with income.
When demand is aﬀected by the income distribution, inequality may be an
important determinant of innovations and growth. The empirical importance
of the inequality-growth relationship is a matter of discussion in the empirical
literature. A number of earlier studies have found a robust negative correla-
tion between growth rates and income inequality in cross-country regressions
(Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995), and
in particular Perotti (1996)). While more recent work by Deininger and Squire
(1998) cast doubt on the robustness of the relationship between growth and the
distribution of income, empirical regularities in the inequality-growth relation-
ship remain. In this paper we do not aim to directly address ﬁndings from this
empirical literature. Our aim is to study the interesting meachanisms and show
under which conditions we get a positive and when we get a negative impact of
inequality on growth.
While recent research has extensively dealt with the question how income
inequality aﬀects the long-run growth performance of economies, little attention
has been paid to the role of the income distribution for product demand and
the resulting impact on innovations. Instead, much of the recent literature has
either focused on the role of capital market imperfections, (see Galor and Zeira
(1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and others) or
on political mechanisms (Bertola (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), and others). In contrast, the present paper focuses on the
role of inequality for the dynamics of an innovator’s demand and does neither
rely on imperfect capital markets nor on politico-economic arguments.
In the standard Schumpeterian growth models consumers have homothetic
preferences. By this assumption, the level of demand for the various goods -
including the innovator’s product - does not depend on the income distribution.
Instead, we study a situation where preferences are non-homothetic and income
distribution has an impact, both on the composition of consumer demand and
on the structure of prices that innovators charge for their product. This yields
a rich set-up that allows us to study the inequality growth-nexus via a channel
that has not attracted much attention in the recent literature on innovation and
growth.1 That this channel has not attracted much attention is surprising given
the empirical evidence. The vast majority of studies of consumer behavior reject
the hypothesis of homothetic preferences (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)).
A hierarchy of wants implies that goods can be ranked according to their
priority in consumption. In this paper, hierarchic preferences are introduced in
a stylized way. In order to satisfy a certain want, consumers buy one unit of
an indivisible good. This implies that poor consumers will only buy a small
range of high priority goods, whereas richer people will consume a wider range
1A notable exception is Pasinetti (1980), he discusses extensively the inﬂuence of demand
on the growth process.
2including also goods of lower priority. Hence, the incentive to conduct R&D
is aﬀected by the distribution of income as inequality determines the level of
demand and the optimal price of an innovator. Today, the good of an innovator
may be purchased only by a small group of rich people and the willingness to
pay may initially be low. But as incomes grow the size of the market grows
as less wealthy people also become willing to buy. One novel aspect of this
paper is to study how income distribution aﬀe c t st h et i m ep a t ho fd e m a n df o r
the innovator’s good; the other novel aspect of the paper is that the prices and
mark-ups of innovators are determined by the distribution. This means we can
study a situation where both depend on the income distribution and both aﬀect
the reward to an innovation. We have therefore a set-up where inequality aﬀects
growth via its impact on product demand.
T h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e ep o i n t sa r et h em a i nﬁndings of our analysis.
First, inequality alters the degree of competition in the economy. With poor
and rich consumers, it may be proﬁtable for the monopolist only to sell to
the rich, whose demand is inelastic (relative to the poor), and thus to charge
higher prices. However, this strategy implies that in the aggregate we have a
distortion in the price structure due to the fact that the poor are excluded from
consumption due to too high prices.
Second, inequality has an a priori ambiguous impact on the incentive to
innovate: On the one hand, with high inequality an innovator faces immediate
demand with a high willingness to pay by the rich consumers; on the other hand,
new markets are small for a long time since only the rich buy. However, we get
the comparative-static result that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, if there is exclusion
of the poor and if the increase in inequality is due to higher income of the rich
group. Higher inequality increases the proﬁt share of the economy what induces
the agents to allocate more resources in R&D, this enhances growth. Instead,
if higher inequality is due to an enlargement of the poor group although their
relative wealth remains constant, higher inequality may reduce growth. The
important message is that higher inequality per se is a too crude statement to
decide how the demand structure is aﬀected. The result suggests that higher
inequality due to a smaller size of wealthy people is especially harmful for proﬁts
and thus for growth.
Third, if there is no exclusion of the poor, the inequality-growth relation
changes its sign. The case of no exclusion can only arise, if some goods in
the economy are supplied at marginal cost. If not all goods in the economy
are supplied by monopolists, who receive the reward for their innovation, there
exists a ”non-innovative” sector in the economy, because the revenues of those
goods do not create innovation incentives. The presence of those goods limits
the scope for price setting by innovators, because the marginal willingness to
pay for innovative products is bounded also for the very rich. Then, once a
rather egalitarian distribution is considered, the innovator has no incentive to
set prices that would exclude the poor. Thus, prices are determined by the
willingness to pay of the poor. An even more egalitarian distribution allows
the monopolist to set higher prices and earn higher proﬁts as the poor are the
’critical’ consumers that determine demand at the extensive margin.
3The role of inequality and hierarchic preferences in the context of economic
development has been studied in a few other papers. The present paper is related
to that of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). Like in the present model,
they show that the adoption of eﬃcient methods of production requires large
markets and excessive concentration of wealth may be an obstacle to economic
development. However, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) focus on a static
framework. As a consequence, changes in income distribution matter only if
t h ed e m a n do ft h em a r g i n a lﬁrm is aﬀe c t e d .T h i si sd i ﬀerent from the present
model where not only the level but also the time path of demand aﬀects growth.2
Models that study the impact of inequality and product demand on growth
include Chou and Talmain (1996), Falkinger (1994), and Zweimüller (2000).
These papers have in common that while income distribution aﬀects there is
no impact of the distribution on prices. Hence an important mechanism of the
present model, namely that the poor may be excluded from the market as a
result of the monopolists pricing decision, does not occur in these models.3
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section
3 studies the static equilibrium in detail. Section 4 deals with the supply side
of the economy, Section 5 discusses the innovation process. In Section 6 we
introduce our assumption on inequality and Section 7 we can study the general
equilibrium of the model. Section 8 discusses the impact of inequality on growth.
Section 9 concludes.
2 A model of hierarchic preferences and monop-
olistic competition
2.1 Hierarchic preferences and consumption choices
Consider an economy with many households earning diﬀerent incomes (and
owning diﬀerent wealth levels). While there is heterogeneity with respect to
income and wealth, all consumers have the same preferences. There exist many
potentially produceable, diﬀerentiated products indexed by a continuous index
j ∈ [0,∞). Consumers’ preferences over these diﬀerentiated goods are ’hierar-
chic’ in the sense that there is a clear priority in consumption: food has highest
priority, clothing have second highest, and so on; only when needs of higher pri-
ority are satisﬁed, the consumption of additional products with lower priority
is considered.
To capture the idea of a hierarchic structure of needs and wants we specify
preferences over the diﬀerentiated goods as follows: There is a baseline utility,
v(c(j)), that captures the utility derived when good j is consumed in quantity
c(j). The function v(.) is the same for all diﬀerentiated goods, i.e. does not
2Other papers which study the impact of inequality on product demand are Eswaran and
Kotwal (1993) and Baland and Ray (1991) both of which stick to a static framework. See also
Bourguignon (1992).
3For models where inequality drives the incentive to improve the quality of products see
Glass (1996), Li (1996), and Zweimüller and Brunner (1996, 1998).
4depend directly on j and to introduce a hierarchy, we introduce a weighting
function ξ(j),w i t hξ
0(j) < 0. Because ξ(.) is monotonically decreasing in j we
have a hierarchic structure of preferences: low-j goods get a high weight (=
get high priority in consumption) whereas high-j goods have comparably low
priority.
Before we proceed let us make two further assumptions, the ﬁrst is primarily
for analytical convenience and the second makes sure that the model exhibits
a balanced growth path. First, we assume that the choice to buy a certain
diﬀerentiated product is a take-it or leave-it decision: either a good is consumed
in which case one and only one unit is purchased, or is not consumed. This
allows us to normalize the baseline utility such that v(0) = 0 and v(1) = 1.
The second assumption concerns the hierarchy: Throughout the analysis we
will assume that the weighting function that generates the hierarchy of needs
and wants is a power-function, i.e. we assume ξ(j)=j−γ with γ ∈ (0,1].4
T h ep r e f e r e n c e so v e rt h ed i ﬀerentiated products can thus be represented by








w h e r ew em a k eu s eo ft h ea b o v en o r m a l i z a t i o nv(c(j)) ≡ c(j). Since c(j) can
take only two values, 0 or 1. Evidently, c(j) is a dummy variable indicating
w h e t h e ro rn o tg o o dj is consumed. Take the case when a consumer purchases





0 j−γdi = N1−γ
1−γ and, due to the restriction
γ ∈ [0,1), the integral
R N
0 j−γdi does not diverge. While the highest utility
arises from consuming all goods in the interval [0,N], it is also evident that the
utility integral is ﬁnite for any arbitrary bundle of goods with measure N:a n y
arbitrary interval of measure N (or sub-intervals that sum up to measure N)
yields instantaneous utility larger than 0 but lower than N1−γ
1−γ .
Apart from the sector of diﬀerentiated products, there exists also a second
sector that produces a homogeneous good x that can be consumed in continuous
amounts. A possible diﬀerent interpretation of x to which we will frequently
refer, is leisure. The total utility ﬂow at any instant is given by the utility
received from consuming diﬀerentiated products and the utility received from
consuming the homogenous good. We assume that the two types of goods are
linked by a Cobb-Douglas relationship with parameter ν,w h e r e0 ≤ ν < 1.5
4Assumption (i) is made for tractability of the model. In particular, this assumption allows
us to calculate the monopoly price of the various goods explicitely in terms of the parameters
of the model, and in particular, in terms of income inequality in the model.
Assumption (ii) is essential in the sense that in equilibrium the utility function is CRRA
in expenditures which guarantees a balanced growth path. See Foellmi (1999). Provided that
ﬁrms have the same constant marginal cost and goods are priced either at marginal cost or
at the monopoly price, then any baseline utility with v(0) < ∞,v 0(c) > 0 and v”(c) < 0 leads
to a solution such that the maximized CRRA function.
5As it implies constant expenditure shares, the Cobb-Douglas is a fair formulation in the





Now consider the decision problem of household i. Households are heteroge-
nous with respect to their available budget Ei but otherwise identical.6 It is
assumed that the ﬁrst N products in the hierarchy are actually available on
t h em a r k e t ,w h e r e a sg o o d si nt h ei n t e r v a l(N,∞) have not yet been invented.7
We denote by p(j) t h ep r i c eo ft h ed i ﬀerentiated product j and by px the price
of one unit of the homogenous good x. Total expenditures of household i are
given by Ei =
R N
0 ci(j)p(j)dj +pxxi where ci(j) indicates whether household i








j−γci(j)dj s.t. Ei ≥
Z N
0
ci(j) p(j)dj − pxxi (2)
Taking expenditures and prices as given, consumer i maximizes his utility by
choosing which diﬀerentiated products to consume {ci(j)}j∈[0,N], and by choos-
ing the optimal amount of the homogenous good xi. T os o l v et h ea b o v ep r o b l e m








0 ci(j) p(j)dj − pxxi
´
where λi is the Lagrangian mulitplier, which in our context may be in-
terpreted as consumer i’s marginal value of wealth. Maximization of the La-
sense that higher inequality does not imply per se consumption of the traditional good to rise,
as is done in other approaches.
6As we assume intertemporal additive separability of the utility function, we can apply
two-stage budgeting: The consumers’ decision can be split up into two parts: In the ﬁrst
stage, we look at the intratemporal decision problem by solving for the optimal structure
of consumption at a point of time, given current prices of all goods p(j) and px and the
currently available budget Ei. In the second stage, we look at the intertemporal decision
problem and calculate how to allocate the consumers’ lifetime resources across time. While
t h et i m ep a t ho fEi is endogenous, we can take it as given when solving for the optimal
structure of expenditures at a given point of time.
7We are making a shortcut here: more generally we could assume that a bundle of goods
with measure N is available on the market but that this measure does not necessarily coincide
with the interval (0,N) in the hierarchy, i.e. there are ’ andholes’ in the sense that goods
with higher priority are still not available whereas goods with low priority have already been
invented.
We will abstract from this possibility here as we are primarily interested in the behavior
of the economy along the balanced growth path. This means, we start here already with a
situation which will prevail in the balanced growth equilibrium, namely when the introduction
of new goods follows the prespeciﬁed hierarchy of needs and wants. In equilibrium, therefore,
there will be no holes as the most recent innovator produces always the goods which has least
priority among all goods that are actually available on the market.
6grangian with respect to {c(j)} and x yields following ﬁrst order conditions
ci(j)=1 if p(j) ≤ xν
i j−γ/λi ≡ qi(j) (3)






The ﬁrst two conditions say that consumer i will consume good j if its price p(j)
is lower than (or equal to) consumer i’s willingness to pay xν
i j−γ/λi which from
now on we denote by qi(j).8 The third condition is the familiar condition that
says the homogenous good x is consumed up to the point where the marginal
utility of consumption of x equals the utility-adjusted price λipx.
2.2 The determination of prices and the structure of con-
sumption
Our next step is to discuss the determination of prices. It is assumed that the
homogenous good is produced with constant marginal cost and supplied on a
competitive market. Hence the price of the homogenous good px is constant,
and exogenously given by the constant marginal cost. (As our aim is to study
g r o w t h ,w ew i l lc o m eb a c kt ot h ei s s u eo fh o wpx changes over time below).
The diﬀerentiated products are also produced at constant marginal costs but
supplied on monopolistic markets, as each good has a single supplier. As our
aim is to study the implications of hierarchic preferences for distribution and
growth, we will assume throughout the paper that all heterogeneity across ﬁrms
comes only from the demand side (i.e. is the result of the hierarchic prefer-
ences) whereas the supply conditions are symmetric. We therefore assume that
marginal costs are the same for all monopolistic ﬁrms. Without loss of general-
ity, we take the marginal cost as the numeraire. (When we discuss intertemporal
issues below, we will see that the marginal production cost is also constant over
time, as input prices grow pari passu with productivity).
Consider a monopolist that supplies some good j. Recall that each household
either consumes one unit or does not consume good j. Hence the level of demand
depends on how many consumers are willing to purchase good j at a given price
p(j). If all households had the same budget (the representative agent case),
the demand function of the monopolist is horizontal at the price equal to the
representative agent’s willingness to pay, and vertical at quantity 1 (the size of
the population). In other words, the monopoly price would be equal to p(j)=
q(j)=xνj−γ/λ, where λ and x are, respectively, the respresentative consumer’s
marginal value of wealth and optimal consumption of the homogenous good.
Things are somewhat more complicated when consumers are heterogeneous
which is the case of our primary interest. The basic point can be illustrated by
8This condition comes from comparing the received utility from consuming good j, xν
i j−γ,
with its price p(j) times consumer i’s marginal utility of wealth λi. Rearranging terms yields
p(j) ≤ xν
i j−γ/λi.
7focusing on the case when there are only two types of households, rich R and
poor P. Let us assume a fraction β is poor and 1−β are rich. The willingsness to
pay for the poor and for the rich is, respectively, qP(j) and qR(j).C o n s e q u e n t l y
the market demand function is a step function (Figure 1) that starts at quantity
0 and p(j)=qR(j), is then horizontal up to the kink at quantity 1 − β and is
then ﬂat at p(j)=qP(j) up to the maximum quantity 1.9 The monopoly price
is then either at point A or at point B in ﬁgure 1, whichever yields the higher
proﬁts.
figure 1
The next step is to look at the equilibrium price structure, that we ask the
question how the equilibrium value of p(j) varies with j. Each monopolistic
supplier compares the level of proﬁts when charging the richs’ willingness to
pay qR(j) and getting demand 1−β with the level of proﬁts that obtains when
charging the poors’ willingness to pay qP(j) and getting maximum demand 1.
The corresponding proﬁt levels are, respectively, [qR(j) − 1](1−β) ≡ ΠR(j) and
[qP(j) − 1] ≡ Πtot(j). (Recall that we have normalized the constant marginal
production costs to unity). In other words, good j will be priced at the willing-
ness to pay of the poor if Πtot(j) ≥ ΠR(j) or if qP(j)−qR(j)(1−β) ≥ β > 0. Note
that the latter condition must hold for some j so also qP(j)/qR(j) ≥ (1 − β)
must hold for some j. But note that qP(j)/qR(j) does not depend on j so
qP(j)/qR(j) ≥ (1 − β) must hold in the static equilibrium.
To solve for the equilibrium price structure in the economy we ﬁrst note that
a situation where only the rich buy goods from monopolistic producers cannot
be an equilibrium. If the poor would not buy any diﬀerentiated products at all,
their willingsness to pay would become inﬁnitely large as their marginal utility
of income would become zero. Hence the poor will always buy some goods
from the hierarchy so that there exists discrete measure of goods for which
Πtot(j) ≥ ΠR(j) holds.
Secondly, a natural conjecture is that the goods are priced such that those
with the highest priority (low-j goods) are purchased by both the poor and the
rich whereas the goods with lower priority (high-j goods) are priced such that
only the rich can aﬀord them. If this conjecture holds in equilibrium there is a
’ciritical’ good in the hierarchy, call it NP, such that for any j ≤ NP we have
Πtot(j) ≥ ΠR(j) and for any j>N P we have Πtot(j) < ΠR(j). To see that this





which means that the diﬀerence Πtot(j)−ΠR(j) decreases as we move along the
hierarchy. Using the deﬁnition qi(j)=xν








jqP(j). Hence Πtot(j) − ΠR(j)
9Obviously, if there are more types of consumers, there are more such kinks, and in the
case of continuous distribution we have a smooth demand function. In any case, under the
take-it or leave-it assumption the shape of the demand function reﬂects the distribution of
the consumers’ budgets.
8decreases in j if qP(j)/qR(j) ≥ (1−β) which must hold in equilibrium (see last
paragraph).
We can now state the following
Lemma 1 a) ’Consumption along the hierarchy’. Prices are set such that for
all goods j ∈ [0,N P], ﬁrms charge the price the poor are willing to pay p(j)=
qP(j), and for all j ∈ (NP,NR] we have p(j)=qR(j). Hence the poor consume
all goods j ∈ [0,N P] and the rich consume all goods j ∈ [0,N R] where 0 <N P ≤
NR ≤ N. This means we have ’consumption along the hierarchy’ in the sense
that consumer i purchases only the ﬁrst Ni products in the hierarchy and no
products j>N i.
b) ’Market exclusion of the poor’. If the willingnesses to pay of the rich
and the poor are suﬃciently diﬀerent we get NP <N R. In such a situation the
suppliers of low-priority goods set prices too high for the poor. In other words,
the poor are excluded from participation in the market for low-priority goods. If
ν =0 , t h ep o o rw i l la l w a y sb ee x c l u d e df r o ms o m eg o o d si ne q u i l i b r u m .
Part a) of Lemma 1 follows immediately from the above discussion. To see
that Part b) is true, assume ν =0 .I fNP = NR = ¯ N were an equilibrium, then,
rich and poor would consume exactly the same, since there is no expenditure for
x-goods. This would imply that the rich have income left causing their marginal
utility of income be zero and thus their marginal willingness to pay be inﬁnity.
Hence it would be proﬁtable for a monopolist to deviate, since he could raise
proﬁts by selling only to the rich.
At this point several remarks are in place. First, we observe that the equi-
librium will be one of the following three scenarios. We could have a situation
where (i) only the rich can buy all products that are available on the market,
so that NP <N R = N; (ii) both the poor and the rich will buy all products
that are available on the market, so NP = NR = N; and (iii) where neither the
rich nor the poor can aﬀord all N goods, so NP <N R < N. The ﬁrst scenario
will prevail if the willingnesses to pay are suﬃciently diﬀerent between the rich
and the poor, (which will be the case if inequality in the available budgets is
suﬃciently high.) For the second scenario exactly the opposite is true. The
third scenario is possible if the inherited measure of producable goods is very
large, even relative to willingness to pay of the richest consumer.
Secondly, we note that by setting the price equal to qR(j), the monopolist
sets a price that the poor cannot aﬀord. Thus it appears that it is always at the
discretion of the monopolist whether or not the poor can participate in a certain
market. But it may also be that even at the lowest possible price (the marginal
production cost) the poor are not willing to buy. In this latter case, it is not at
the discretion of the monopolist to exclude the poor from that market as selling
only to the rich is the only vialbe alternative for the monopolistic supplier.
Thirdly, and more generally, we observe that in our model of hierarchic
preferences, the structure of prices is determined by the distribution of of the
willingnesses to pay of the various consumers, which themselves reﬂects the dis-
tribution of the households’ budgets. This is a result that is absent from the
9standard monopolistic competition due to the assumption of homothetic pref-
erences: total market demand there is independent of the income distribution
and has therefore no eﬀect of the structure of prices. (The same is true for pre-
vious attempts to combine a hierarchic structure of demand with market power,
where a uniform mark-up is assumed for all products. Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny
(1989), Zweimüller (2000)).
Finally, we observe that the distribution of the willingnesses to pay (which
reﬂects the personal distribution of income) aﬀects the choice of prices and
therefore also the aggregate proﬁts. So, in our model the personal distribution
of income aﬀects the functional distribution.
3 Solving the consumers’ problem
We can now characterize the choice problem of the consumers in this economy.
As mentioned above, consumers maximize utility over an inﬁnite horizon and
due to the additivity of the utility function we can solve the problem by two-
stage budgeting. This means we can split the problem into a static one and
a dynamic one. In their static choice consumers take expenditures at a given
point of time as given and ask how to allocate these expenditures across the
homogeneous good and the diﬀerentiated products along the hierarchy. The
dynamic choice problem is then to ask for the optimal allocation of lifetime
ressources over time, taking the structure of consumption at a given point of
time as given.10 We will ﬁrst look at the static equilibrium before we discuss
the dynamic solution of the consumers’ problem. Furthermore, in presenting the
static and the dynamic solutions we concentrate on the case when the rich but
not the poor buy all products that are available on the market (NP <N R = N)
and describe the corresponding equilibria in some detail. At the end of this
section we will also brieﬂy mention the two remaining scenarios namely, when
neither the rich nor the poor can aﬀord all N goods (NP <N R < N); and when
both the poor and the rich buy all available products (NP = NR = N).
3.1 The static equilibrium
A static equilibrium is a structure of consumption of the diﬀerentiated products
{ci(j)}j∈[0,N], a corresponding structure of prices of these products {p(j)}j∈[0,N],
the consumption levels of the homogeneous product xi, and the marginal util-
ities of wealth λi, where i =( R,P). When we present the solution we take as
predetermined the measure of available products N (from the innovation process
prior to the point of time we consider), the consumers’ budgets Ei (from the ﬁrst
stage of our two-stage budgeting problem), the constant marginal production
costs in the monopolistic sector (taken as numeraire) and in the competitive
sector (equal to px). Exogenous are the utility parameters γ and ν and the
population size of poor β.
10We will see that the problem is even easier as, along a balanced growth path, the structure
of consumption (as measured in eﬃciency units) does not change over time.
10As mentioned above, the equilibrium can take various forms. Here we con-
centrate on the case when the rich but not the poor buy all products that are
available on the market (NP <N R = N) and describe the corresponding static
equilibrium in some detail. At the end of this section we will also brieﬂym e n -
tion the two remaining scenarios namely, when neither the rich nor the poor
can aﬀord all N goods (NP <N R < N); and when both the poor and the rich
buy all available products (NP = NR = N).
To characterize the static equilibrium in the interesting case NP <N R = N
it will be convenient to introduce two new variables, (i) the fraction of avail-
able goods that the poor can aﬀord, nP ≡ NP/N, and (ii) the price of good
N, p ≡ p(N). It turns out that, once the equilibrium values of these two vari-
ables are known, the equilibrium structure of consumption {ci(j)}j∈[0,N] and
the corresponding structure of prices {p(j)}j∈[0,N] can be derived immediately.
Hence when presenting the solution to the static equilibrium we can replace
{ci(j)}j∈[0,N] and {p(j)}j∈[0,N] by nP and p and describe this solution in terms
of the endogenous variables nP,p,xP,x R,λP and λR.
To see how nP and p determine {ci(j)}j∈[0,N] and {p(j)}j∈[0,N], recall from
Lemma 1, that equilibrium value of nP suﬃces to determine the equilibrium
structure of consumption {ci(j)}j∈[0,N]. The derivation of the equilibrium struc-
ture of prices {p(j)}j∈[0,N] in terms of nP and p requires more steps. Consider
ﬁrst the lower priority goods j ∈ (NP,N]. We recall from Lemma 1 that these
goods are priced at the willingness to pay of the rich p(j)=qR(j), and from




. Hence for the goods that




. Now consider the goods with
high priority j ∈ [0,N P]. According to Lemma 1 these goods are priced at
the willingness to pay of the poor, so p(j)=qP(j), and from equation (3) we
know that qP(j)=qP(NP)(j/NP)
−γ . Hence for the goods that both groups of
consumers purchase we have p(j)=p(NP)(j/NP)
−γ . It remains to determine
p(NP) in terms of nP and p. Recall that, for the critical good NP, the corre-
sponding ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between selling only to the rich at price qR(NP)=
pn
−γ
P or by serving the whole market at price p(NP)=qP(NP). Hence we
must have qP(NP) − 1=( pn
−γ
P − 1)(1 − β). Assuming the ﬁrm supplying
good NP charges the willingness to pay of the poor and serves the whole mar-
ket, we get p(NP)=qP(NP) and we can express p(NP) in terms of p as:
p(NP)=β + pn
−γ
P (1 − β). Taken together we can express the equilibrium




















Having determined {ci(j)}j∈[0,N] and {p(j)}j∈[0,N] in terms of nP and p we
are now ready to describe the solution to the static equilibrium of the model
in terms of the six endogenous variables nP,p,xP,x R,λP and λR.T h e s i x
11equations that determine this equilibrium are given by






























































Equations (S1) and (S2) say that the price of good NP equals to the willingness
to pay of the poor for good NP, and that the price for good N equals the
willingness to pay of the rich for good N. Equations (S3) and (S4) say that,
for both types of consumers, the optimal level of xi is determined such that the
marginal utility of xi equals its utility-adjusted price λipx. Finally, equations
(S5) and (S6) state that the budget constraints have to be satisﬁed for both
types of consumers.
3.2 Static expeditures and utilities
For further use, it is convenient to reduce this system to two equations in the
two unknowns nP and p. These two interesting equations are the budget con-
straints when consumers have made optimal consumption choices, that is their
’expenditure functions’. Moreover, we can also express the maximized utility
functions in terms of the endogenous variables in terms of nP and p, that is the
’indirect utility functions’.11















11We use the terms ’expenditure function’ and ’indirect utility function’ in the sense that
expenditures (utility) evaluated after consumers have made optimal choices. We do not ex-
plicitely specify the (minimized) expenditures in terms of utility and prices and the (maxi-
mized) utility in terms of prices and expenditures. It should be clear that using the relations
d e r i v e di nt h et e x tt h i sc a nb ee a s i l yd o n e .






































we note that, for given values of nP and p, EP and N as well as ER and N
are proportional. (This is a result of Cobb-Douglas preferences; the power-
function for the hierarchy-index; and the constant marginal production cost of
the diﬀerentiated products).
We proceed to calculate the maximized static utility function in terms of the
endogenous variables nP and p. Substituting the relations (5) and (6) into the
utility ﬂow function (2). This yields for the rich












and for the poor
uP(nR =1 ,n P < 1, p>1) =
µ£















From (7) and (8) we know that, for given values of nP and p, the range of
available goods N and the expenditure levels Ei are proportional for both types
of consumers. And we will see below that also the price of the homogeneous











Equation (11) gives the important result that instantaneous utility is of the
CRRA-type with hierarchy-parameter γ as the relevant parameter.12
12An important observation can be made here though the utilities of the rich and the
poor are CRRA in their expenditures over time, the ratio of utility between the poor and
the rich at a given point of time does not exhibit a CRRA relationship, even if v =0 ,i . e .
u(xR(t),nR(t))





in general. The reason is that the expenditure share of a single
good is not the same for the rich and the poor, they even do not consume the same goods.
Since prices of the various goods are diﬀerent, rich and poor face a diﬀerent average price
level.
133.3 Intertemporal allocation of expenditures
We now ask the question how consumption expenditures are allocated over time.
As we are interested in the balanced growth path of the economy, we will analyze
as i t u a t i o nw h e r eN and Ei grow at the same rate. This means that, along a
balanced growth path, (see equations (7) and (8)). To study the intertemporal
problem we change notation slightly: as np and p are constant over time we
drop the arguments (nP, p) in the utility funtion and replace it by the time
index s.S oui(t) is the maximized instanteous utility at date t.
Suppose time is continuous and consumers maximize lifetime utility U(t)
over an inﬁnite horizon where lifetime utility is additively separable and the








where the parameter ρ > 0 denotes the rate of time preference and the pa-
rameter σ > 0 describes the consumers’ willingness to shift total consumption
( a sm e a s u r e sb yui(s))o v e rt i m ew h e r e1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. From (11) we know that also the instanteous utility is of the
CRRA-type (in expenditures) with parameter γ and we may interpret 1/γ as
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (among goods along the hierarchy).
The consumers’ lifetime resources are given by the discounted value of a
labor income ﬂow {w(s)li}s∈[t,∞),w h e r eli denotes the labor endowment of
consumuer i, and the value of assets individual i owns at date t, Vi(t). The






w(s)lie−r(s−t)ds + Vi(t) (13)
where r is the interest rate. Since expenditures are proportional to N(t) in
equilibrium, the growth rate of expenditures is constant, since we are in steady
state. The Euler equation below, which is the solution to the intertemporal







4 The supply side
As mentioned above, the aim of the paper is to analyze the implications of
hierarchic preferences for distribution and growth. This means the main focus
comes of our analysis is on heterogeneity that comes from the demand side of
the economy. The supply side plays a less central role and to keep things simple
we assume symmetry of ﬁrms as far as production possibilities are concerned.
This means that all monopolistic ﬁrms have access to the same production
14technology; and that it is equally costly to design the blueprint and set up the
necessary production facilities for a new product, irrespective of the position of
this good in the hierarchy.
In this section we describe the supply side of the economy, both the situation
in the various sectors at a given point of time and the dynamics of productivity
in that sector. Having done that, we can look at the ressource constraint of the
economy and can discuss the equilibrium allocation of ressources across sectors.
We will conﬁne the analysis to the situation that prevails along a balanced
growth path.
When describing the equilibrium allocation of resources across sectors in
this Section, we still concentrate on the case where the rich, but not the poor,
can aﬀord all goods that are available on the market. That is we focus on the
case NP <N R = N. The equilibrium allocation fo ressources remaining two
cases, NP <N R < N (when neither the rich nor the poor can aﬀord all N
goods), and NP = NR = N (all households purchase all N goods) are brieﬂy
discussed in Section 7. (The detailed derivations for these cases are presented
in the Appendix).
4.1 Production technology and technical progress
To keep things as simple as possible we assume that labor is the only production
factor and that the labor market is competitive. The market clearing wage at
date t is denoted by e w(t). Consider ﬁrst the monopolistic sector that produces
the diﬀerentiated goods along the hierarchy. We assume that the technology in
this sector exhibits increasing returns to scale. Before a good can be produced a
ﬁxed cost has to be incurred. Having incurred this ﬁxed cost the ﬁrm gets access
to the blueprint of the new good in the hierarchy and gets a monopoly position
on this new market.13 (This is what we will call an ’innovation’ henceforth).
This ﬁxed cost consist of a ﬁxed labor input e F(t) and the ﬁxed cost is e w(t)e F(t),
equal for all goods. It is assumed that e F(t) decreases over time as a result
of technical progress. Just like in many recent endogenous growth models, we
assume that technical progress is driven by innovations, that is we assume e F(t)
is inversely related to the aggregate knowledge stock of knowledge A(t) that
reﬂects the economy-wide productivity at date t. We assume that the knowledge
stock of this economy equals the number of known designs, hence we have A(t)=
N(t).W e c a n t h u s w r i t ee F(t)= F
A(t) = F
N(t)where F>0 is an exogenous
parameter. Once an innovation has taken place the corresponding output good
can be produced with the linear technology
l(j,t)=e b(t)y(j,t) (15)
where l(j,t) is labor employed to produce good j at date t, y(j,t) is the quantity
produced and b(t) is the unit labor requirement. Marginal cost at date t is
13By assumption, we rule out that there is no duplication. So when a new good is ’invented’
there is one and only one ﬁrm that incurs that ﬁxed cost and captures the respective market.
15e w(t)b(t), equal for all goods, where e w(t) i st h ew a g er a t et h a ta p p l i e st ot h e
whole economy.
We assume that - as a result of technical progress - not only e F(t) but also
b(t) decreases over time. Just like before we assume that technical progress in
the production process is a result of innovations that produce new knowledge
which leads also to higher productivity of the inputs in the monopolistic sec-
tor. Again we model this by assuming that b(t)=
1/w
N(t),w h e r ew>0 is an
exogenously given parameter. Along the balanced growth path it must be that
wages growth with productivity, so e w(t) must be proportional to N(t).M o r e -
over, we have normalized marginal production cost to unity so, for all t,w e
must have e w(t)b(t)=1 . But this can only be the case if wages grow according
to e w(t)=wN(t).
We also note that our assumptions about technology and technical progress
imply that the set-up cost of developing a new good is constant over time and
equal to e w(t)e F(t)=wN(t) F
N(t) = wF.
Finally, the marginal cost of a traditional ﬁrm which produces good x has
to be determined. We assume a linear technology lx = bxx where lx denotes
the labor input for good x and bx is the labor input coeﬃcient which, by as-
sumption, does not change over time. S i n c et h ew a g ea td a t et is given by
e w(t)=wN(t), the marginal cost and hence the price of good x at date t is
given by px(t)=wbxN(t). But this also implies that px(t)/N(t) equals wbx
which is an exogenously given time-invariant constant.
F i n a l l y ,w ed e n o t eb yg t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fN(t). On a balanced growth path









NR(t),t h i si m p l i e st h a tN(t)=N(0)egt.
4.2 The resource constraint
The economies’ resources consist of the stock of knowledge A(t) and homoge-
neous labor supplied by each household in the economy. The stock of knowlegde
is given by the measure of past innovations N(t) and the labor supply is nor-
malized to unity. We now proceed by discussing how the labor force is allocated
across the various sectors. We denote by LN the number of workers employed
in the sector producing the diﬀerentiated hierarchical products, by LR the num-
ber of workers that employed in research to design the blueprints for new such
products, and by Lx the number of workers employed in the sector producing
the homogenous good. Obviously, in the full employment equilibrium we must
have 1=LN + LR + Lx.
Consider ﬁrst employment in the production of the diﬀerentiated products.
Obviously, when NP <N R = N, the resources necessary to produce the diﬀer-














= b(βnP +( 1− β))
16which means that along a balanced growth path employment in the production
of ﬁnal output of hierarchical products remains constant. Secondly, the level of
employment in the research sector is given by the level of innovative activity
at date t. Note that, at date t,
·
N new goods are introduced and each such
innovation requires a unit labor input F







workers are employed in the R&D sector at t. Finally, employment in the













2nP +( 1− β)pn
1−γ
P +( 1− β)p
´
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e de q u a t i o n s( 5 )a n d( 6 ) .
In sum, when the rich but not the poor can aﬀord all availabe products in
the economy, that is in the case NP <N R = N, t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n to ft h e
economy is given by the equation






2nP +( 1− β)pn
1−γ
P +( 1− β)p
´
5 The innovation process
To study the impact of hierarchic preferences on distribution and growth we have
to specify what determines the level of innovative activities in the economy. An
incentive to devote additional resource to innovative activities exists as long as
the return to an innovation is larger than the ﬁxed cost to introduce a new good.
Hence the equilibrium has to be characterized by a situation where the value of
an innovation is less than or equal to the costs of an innovation. Above we have
already seen that the innovations costs equal wF.
The value of an innovation depends on the resulting future proﬁt ﬂow. This
in turn depends on (i) how the level of demand develops over time, and (ii) on
how the prices that innovators can charge for their product change over time.
Consider a ﬁrm, that at date t, incurs the set-up costs and is granted a patent
of inﬁnte length. First of all, it should be intuitively clear that this good is the
one with least priority among all the goods actually available; and it is the good
with the highest priority among those goods that have not yet been invented.
This latter observation come from the fact that, as we have no uncertainty, new
innovators will always target their innovation activities towards those goods for
which the consumers have the highest willingness to pay. In other words, the
R&D process leads to ’innovation along the hierarchy’.
17Now consider how the ﬂow proﬁt of the innovator of good N(t) develops
over time. In the case NP <N R = N, on which we are focusing throughout
this section, such a new ﬁrm has initially demand 1 − β as only the rich can
initially aﬀord the new product. The price level is initially equal to p but changes
over time as new innovations take place resulting in productivity increase and
corresponding increases in income, which in turn lead to a higher willingness to
pay for the existing good allowing previous innovators to charge higher prices.
Denote by N(s0) the good produced by the most recent innovator at date s0 >t .
Obviously the price this ﬁrm can charge is given by p.T h e ﬁrm producing
good N(t) can charge a higher price as good N(t) has a higher priority than
good N(s0),t h a ti sw eh a v eN(t) < N(s0). From equation (4) we know that,
as long as only the rich purchase the product, the corresponding price equals
p(N(t)) = p [N(t)/N(s0)]−γ.
After suﬃcient time has passed there will be enough growth in incomes that
also the poor are willing to purchase good N(t). At that date, demand jumps to
its maximum level, equal to 1, and stays there forever.14 At which date does that
happen? Denote by ∆ the time it takes until the poor can purchase good N(t).
Obviously, ∆ is deﬁned by the equation NP(t + ∆)=N(t). Along a balanced
growth path, all variables grow at rate g, so also NP(t) will grow at rate g. The
equation deﬁning ∆ can therefore be rewritten as NP(t)eg∆ = N(t) from which
it follows that ∆ = −ln[NP(t)/N(t)]/g = −lnnP/g. Obviously, the duration
∆ is long (i) if the poor are very poor (so the fraction of goods the poor can
aﬀord, nP, is small); and (ii) if the growth rate g is low. Using again equation
(4), we can determine the prices the innovator of N(t) charges after the poor
have started to purchase. Denote by N(s00) the good introduced by the most
recent innovator at date s00 ≥ t + ∆. We know that the price for good N(s00)
equals p, whereas the price of the good N(t), which is now purchased by both
the rich and the poor, equals p(N(t)) = [βn
γ
P +( 1− β)p][ N(t)/N(s00)]−γ =
[βn
γ
P +( 1− β)p]egγ(s00−t)














P +( 1− β)p]egγ(s−t) − 1
´
e−r(s−t)ds (16)























w h e r ew eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition φ = r − gγ and the fact that from (14) r =
ρ + g(σ(1 − γ)+γ).
14That an innovator stays on the market forever is a simplifying assumption. We could
introduce, for instance, ﬁnite patent protection and assume that the market become compet-
itive once the patent has expired. Our main conclusions would unchanged, as long as patents
expire before the poor can aﬀord the good. If patents expire earlier, it is only the willingsness
to pay of the rich that counts for the incentive to innovate.
186 The distribution of income and wealth
Until now we have assumed that there are two types of consumers with pop-
ulation size β for the poor and 1 − β for the rich. Furthermore, we have let
the consumers’ income out of labor and assets be diﬀerent between households,
leading to diﬀerences in the optimal budgets Ei(t) between consumers. These
diﬀerences, in turn, imply certain structures of consumption and prices, and
determine the level of aggregate employment in sectors producing, respectively,
the homogenous product and the hierarchical products in the economy.
Our analysis led us to conclude that the personal distribution of income af-
fects the structure of prices. For instance, in the scenario we are focussing on,
NP <N R = N,w em u s th a v eas u ﬃciently dispersed distribution of budgets,
such that only the rich buy all goods, but the poor cannot aﬀord all of these
goods. On the other hand, the scenario, where NP = NR = N is obviously
more likely if inequality in income and wealth is lower (and will be the outcome
with perfect equality). We have also found that the structure of prices is deter-
mined by the personal distribution, which in turn implies that the proﬁt level
of each ﬁrm and hence also aggregate proﬁts are determined by the personal
distribution. Consequently, in this model the personal distribution of income
aﬀects the distribution of aggregate income between wages and proﬁts, that is
the personal distribtuion determines the functional distribution.
In general it is obvious, that the chain of causality also goes in the other
way. A given distribution of aggregate income leads to a certain distribution
of income between households, because in general, households diﬀer in the rel-
ative importance of the two income sources. Hence a change in the functional
distribution leads to a change in the personal distribution of income.
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we will henceforth assume, that each
household has the same composition of income which means that the share of
labor income is the same both for poor households and for rich households. The
assumption of an identical income composition between the diﬀerent types of
households implies together with CRRA intertemporal utility that the savings
rate is equal among individuals. Hence, the personal distribution of income does
not change over time. Moreover, changes in the functional distribution do not
feed back to the personal distribution, as this just means that the composition
of income of each household changes and, in relative terms it changes equally
within each household. Hence, the relative incomes are not aﬀected, and the
personal distribution is a really exogenous ingredient of the model.
We denote by θ the income level of the poor relative to the average. With
constant savings rates we can directly write the expenditures of poor and rich
in terms of average expenditures: EP(t)=θ ¯ E(t) and ER(t)=
1−βθ
1−β ¯ E(t) where
the latter expression follows from βEP +( 1− β)ER = ¯ E.
It should be clear that this assumption is a simpliﬁcation that allows us
to discuss the impact of income heterogeneity on growth and (the functional)
distribution. Clearly, this assumption is not particularly realistic. (It implies,
for instance, that the distribution of income and the distribution of wealth
are identical, whereas in reality we have a situation where the distribution of
19wealth is more unequal than the distribution of income.) The main reason
why we adopt this assumption is analytical convenience. However, the main
mechanisms that drive the results in this model become clear when we use this
simplifying assumption.



































We note that this equation contains only two unknowns (this is where the dis-
tributional assumption makes things analytically tractable). We note that the
above equation is linear in p which allows us to rewrite this equation as
p =
νβnP + 1−θ












P (1 + ν)
. (17)
We note that, on the right-hand-side of the above equation, the numerator in-
creases and the denominator decrease in nP. This implies that p is monotonically
increasing in nP. Intuitively, when there is a higher level of income, the poor can
aﬀord more goods and the rich are willing to pay more for the existing goods
(they can buy all of them). (The distributional assumption guarantees, that the
relative income diﬀerence remains always constant.)
7 The general equilibrium
The discussion in Sections 3 to 6 has focused on the scenario where the rich, but
not the poor buy the product that has least priority among all goods available
in the market. In that case we have an equilibrium structure of consumption
such that the poor buy all goods in the range [0,N P] whereas the rich buy





discussion is only relevant if the equilibrium outcome is such that NP <N R =
N. However, NP(t),N R(t), and N(t) are themselves endogenously determined.
So, a comprehensive presentation of the general equilibrium of the model has
to take account of all possible equilibria that the model may generate. We
therefore have also to discuss the cases where the equilibrium outcome is such
that no consumer can purchase all N(t) available goods (in which case we have
NP <N R < N); and the outcome where all consumers can buy all N(t) goods
(in which case NP = NR = N).
After having described the various possible equilibrium regimes, we proceed
by discussing the conditions under which the various outcomes will be estab-
lished.
207.1 The three possible regimes
The regime NP <N R = N. In the regime when only the rich but not
the poor purchase all the monopolistic goods that are supplied on the market we
can characterized the equilibrium to the following three equations in the three
unknowns nP,p, and g (we note that φ = ρ + gσ(1 − γ)).
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It is obvious that this system can easily be reduced to two equations in the
two unknowns, by substituting the last equation into, respectively, the zero-
proﬁt condition and the resource constraint. Therefore, the most convenient
presentation of the equilibrium in the regime NP <N R = N is in terms of the
growth rate, g, and the fraction of monopolistic goods that the poor can aﬀord,
nP.
The regime NP <N R < N. In this case where neither the poor nor
the rich can aﬀord all products that are available on the market, the general
equilibrium diﬀers form the above regime in two respects. First, in this scenario
good N has no demand and hence the price of this good, p,i sn o td e ﬁned in
this case. However, the structure of price can be expressed similarly as before
in terms of the price of the good with least priority that is actually purchased.
This good is now NR and we can express all other prices in terms of p(NR).
It is easy to see that the price of good NR must equal the marginal cost, that
is p(NR)=1 . If p(NR) > 1 it would be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm j>N R to start
production since the willingness to pay of the rich would be above marginal
costs.
The second crucial diﬀerence between the regime NP <N R < N and the
regime NP <N R = N is that fraction of goods that the rich can aﬀord is now
an additional endogenous variable. It turns out convenient to express the new
endogenous variables in term of the waiting time of the innovator. Obviously,
a new innovator has no demand at the date when the innovation takes place.
21The reason is that not even the rich can aﬀord this product, and the innovator
has to wait until the rich become willing to pay at least a price that covers
the ﬁrm’s cost of production which equal to unity. Nevertheless, the ﬁrm has
an incentive to make the innovation, and to patent it. This innovation has to
be made in time, and in order to prevent other innovators from capturing this
market the innovation has to be made ’in time’, i.e. before there is demand
for this product. How long is the waiting time? Suppose we are on a balanced
growth path with rate g,a n dt h er i c hc a na ﬀord NR(t) < N(t) products. The
waiting time which we denote by δ is deﬁned by the equation NR(t)egδ = N(t),






. Obviously, the waiting time δ is short when
growth is high and/or when the rich can aﬀord a high fraction of the available
products.
In the appendix we show that the general equilibrium in the regime NP <
NR < N boils down to three equations in the three unknowns, e nP,δ, and g,
w h e r ew en o wh a v enP ≡ NP(t)/NR(t) a st h ef r a c t i o no fg o o d sp u r c h a s e db y
the rich, that the poor can aﬀord. (Note that this is not a change in the
deﬁnition of nP, as in the regime NP <N R = N, nP is also the fraction of
goods purchased by the rich that the poor can aﬀord as we have NR = N;w e
also note that the mass of goods the poor consume at date t, NP(t), is now given
by NP(t)=e−δgnPN(t)). The three equations are the resource constraint, the
zero-proﬁt condition, and the relation of the relative expenditures between the
rich and the poor:
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It should be clear that this system of equaitons reduces conveniently to two
equations in the two unknowns, the growth rate g and the waiting time δ. To
see this, note that the only endogenous variable that shows up in the third
equation is nP. Moreover, the numerator is decreasing and the denominator is
increasing in nP, meaning there is a unique value15 of nP ≡ ˜ nP that satisﬁes
15Note that this value is strictly smaller than 1, since nP =1implies the right hand side of
the static equilibrium condition to be zero.
22the third equation. ˜ nP depends on the primitive parameters of the model γ, β,
θ,a n dν.16 Once nP is determined, we are left with the resource constraint and
the zero-proﬁt condition as the remaining equaitons and with g and δ as the
remaining endogenous variables.
We also note that at the point where the switch from the regime NP <
NR = N to the regime NP <N R < N takes place we have p =1and δ =0 . It
is straightforward to check from both resource constraints and the zero-proﬁt
conditions in both regimes, that these two respective equations become identical
for p =1(in regime NP <N R = N)a n dδ =0(in regime NP <N R < N).
This means that at the switch of the regimes there is no discrete jump in the
grwoth rate g.
The regime NP = NR = N. Finally, it remains to describe the static
equilibrium when we have a situation where both types of consumers purchase all
diﬀerentiated goods that are available on the market, the case NP = NR = N.
There is one crucial diﬀerence to the former two cases: in both of those cases
we had a situation such that the good that has least priority for consumer i,
Ni has a price that is equal to consumer i’s willingness to pay for that good,
qi(Ni). Now, as Ni is identical for both types of consumers, we have a situation
where the good that has least priority for the rich, is priced at the willingness
to pay for the poor. But this means that we have a situation where the richs’
willingness to pay for good N is higher than the price p. This is important as it
implies that the rich spend relatively more of their budget on the homogeneous
good than they would if the ﬁrm could get the willingness to pay from the rich.
The system becomes easier than in the former two cases as we have now a
situation where all consumers buy all goods, so nP =1and δ =0 . Compared to
t h ep r e v i o u sr e g i m e( NP <N R < N) we now get rid of two variables, but have
only one additional variable, the price of good N, which, just like before, we
denote by p. In the Appendix we solve the system step by step, and show that
the general equilibrium can be reduced to two equations, the resource constraint
and the zero-proﬁt condition in two unknowns: the growth rate g,a n dt h ep r i c e
o ft h eg o o dw i t hl e a s tp r i o r i t yp. These equations are















Also here we consider the point where the switch from the regime NP <
NR = N to the regime NP = NR = N takes place. At the switch we have
nP =1 . From the general equilibrium conditions for regime NP <N R = N
16In particular,
∂˜ nP
∂θ > 0 and
∂˜ nP
∂β < 0.
23we immediately see that, when nP =1t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ta n dt h ez e r o -
proﬁt condition become identical to the above two equilibrium conditions for
the regime NP = NR = N.
7.2 A graphical representation of the equilibrium
In the following we will show under which conditions an equilbrium exists and
when it is unique. Furthermore, we will discuss when one of the three regimes
actually occurs. In particular, the analysis will allow us to discuss parameter
constellations that make certain regimes more likely. From the discussion above
we know that the interesting variables are: the growth rate g; the fraction of
goods the poor can aﬀord nP; the waiting time of the most recent innovator δ;
and the price charged by the most recent innovator p.
In this section we discuss the general equilibrium of the model by using a
graphical representation. From the discussion in the last subsection it has be-
come clear that the equilibrium conditions in each regime can be conveniently
reduced to two equations in two unknown. In all three regimes, one of the en-
dogenous variables is the growth rate g. However, the second relevant endoge-
nous variable is diﬀerent across regimes: it is the fraction of goods purchased
by the poor nP in regime Np <N R = ¯ N; it is the innovator’s waiting time δ in
regime NP <N R < ¯ N; and it is price charged by the most recent innovator p in
regime Np = NR = ¯ N. In what follows we will represent the general equilibrium
by looking at the zero-proﬁt condition and the resource constraint (substituting
out the static equilibrium condition) for all three regimes (Figures 3 and 4).
In (g,δ) space for the regime NP <N R < ¯ N; in (g,nP)-space for the regime
NP <N R = ¯ N;a n di n( g,p) space for the regime NP = NR = ¯ N.
Before we start to discuss, respectively, the shapes of the resource constraint
and the zero-proﬁt condition in the various regimes, it is useful to look at the
relevant ranges of the endogenous variables (other than g) in the various regimes.
The problem is easy in regime NP <N R < ¯ N w h e r ew ef o c u so nt h ew a i t i n g
time δ as the second endogenous variable. δ starts at zero which is the case
when the rich are indiﬀerent between purchasing and not purchasing the good
of the most recent innovator. It is also evident that δ may become very large,
inﬁnitely large in the case of stagnation. The problem is less obvious in the two
remaining regimes. NP <N R = ¯ N and NP = NR = ¯ N. The following Lemma
discusses the relevant ranges of the two respective second endogenous variables,
the fraction of goods purchased by the poor nP (in regime NP <N R = ¯ N) and
the price charged by the most recent innovator p (in regime NP = NR = ¯ N).W e
note that these ranges refer to endogenous variables, and the Lemma discusses
how the relevant limits for these endogenous variables depend on the exogenous
parameters of the model. We will say ’a regime becomes more likely’ if the
relevant range of the respective endogenous variable becomes broader.
Lemma 2 (Regime Switches).
a )C o n s i d e ras w i t c hf r o mt h er e g i m eNp <N R < ¯ N to the regime Np <
NR = ¯ N. At the switch the most recent innovator charges price ¯ p =1and has
24no waiting time, so δ =0 . The switch occurs at consumption level of the poor
nP =˜ nP where ˜ nP is the value of nP that satisﬁes equation (23). The regime
Np <N R = ¯ N therefore starts at nP =˜ nP (here the most recent innovator is
indiﬀerent between not selling to the rich and earning no ﬂow proﬁta n ds e l l i n g
to the rich at a price equal the marginal production cost and earning a zero ﬂow
proﬁt), and ends as nP =1(when it becomes optimal for the poor consumers to
c o n s u m ea l la v a i l a b l ev a r i e t i e s ) .
b) Consider a switch from the regime Np <N R = ¯ N to the regime Np =
NR = ¯ N. At the switch the poor start to buy all available varieties, so nP
becomes unity. The most recent innovator becomes indiﬀerent between selling
only to the rich and selling to the entire market. When this ﬁrm sells to only





θ (1+ν) . When this ﬁrm
sells to the entire market, the price is
ˆ p−β
1−β. Consequently, when we are in the
regime Np = NR = ¯ N, the lower limit for the price of the most recent innovator
becomes
ˆ p−β
1−β. (See Figure 2).
Proof. Part b. Insert nP =1into (20) and the formula for ˆ p follows directly.
We proceed by discussing the general equilibrium of the model by looking at
the resource constraint RC and the zero-proﬁt condition Z. We will discuss the
general equilibrium using a graphical representation which is done in Figures 3
and Figures 4 below. Before doing so we study the shape of the two curves in
more detail. This is done in the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 3 (zero proﬁt condition Z)








b) The zero proﬁt condition crosses the np-axis at nz
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b ≤ ˆ p.
c) If 1+ 1
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In the Np <N R = ¯ N regime the value of innovations increases in nP as
can be seen by direct inspection of the zero-proﬁt condition. Though the limits
of the integral depend on nP,t h e yd on o ta ﬀect the derivative’s value because
ΠR(NP)=Πtot(NP). From the above Lemma we know that with ﬂat hierarchy
the value of innovations always falls in the growth rate g. Combining these two
elements it follows that the zero proﬁt condition is monotonically increasing
in (g,np)-space starting at nz
P. In the regime NP = NR = ¯ N the value of
innovations increasing in the price of the most recent innovator ¯ p, and falls in
the growth rate g (again under the conditions of Lemma 1). Hence in this
regime the zero proﬁt constraint monotonically increases in the (g, ¯ p)-space.It
remains to discuss the regime NP <N R < ¯ N. From the zero-proﬁt condition
25it is straightforward to verify that a longer waiting time reduces the value of
innovations.
H e n c ew ec o n c l u d et h a t ,w i t ha’ ﬂat hierarchy’ (see above Lemma), the zero
proﬁt constraint does not ’bend to the left’ and the zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n ti s
monotonically increasing, starting in the regime NP <N R = ¯ N at nz
P > ˜ nP
and then continues to switch to the regime NP = NR = ¯ N.T h er e g i m eNP <
NR < ¯ N is never reached. Hence with a ﬂat hiearchy the zero-proﬁtl o c u s
looks like in Figure 3. With a steep hierarchy things are diﬀerent. In that case
the zero-proﬁt condition is not monotonic. It still starts at nz
P but then has a
negative slope, and may reach the regime NP <N R < ¯ N. As the growth rate g
becomes larger, the slope becomes positive again and reaches again the regime
NP <N R = ¯ N. Finally, for suﬃciently high g, the zero-proﬁtc u r v es w i t c h e st o
the regime NP = NR = ¯ N.
Lemma 4 (resource constraint RC)
a. The resource constraint crosses the nP-axis at nRC
P ≥ ˜ nP if 1 ≥
b(β˜ nP +1− β)+ ν
1−γb[β
2˜ nP + β(1 − β)˜ n
1−γ
P +1− β].
b. The resource constraint crosses the nP-axis at nRC
P ≤ 1 if 1−b







Proof. Part a. The right hand side of the resource constraint (18) increases
in nP. We get the condition directly by inserting g =0into (18).
Part b. From (18) we get a condition that nRC
P ≤ 1,n a m e l yb yn o t i n g





2 + β(1 − β)ˆ p +( 1− β)ˆ p
¢
. Inserting the value ˆ p from Lemma 2 and
rearranging terms, gives us the required result.
Part a of the above Lemma states a necessary condititon for the region
Np <N R = ¯ N to exist. If this condition does not hold the resource constraint
can only be fulﬁlled in the Np <N R < ¯ N regime. Conversely, only if the
condition in Part b of the above Lemma is violated, the equilibrium can be in
the regime NP = NR = ¯ N. This condition says that the diﬀerentiated sector
has to be suﬃciently productive, so that a situation where all consumers buy
all available diﬀerentiated products is feasible. If this is the case, the resource
constraint crosses the ¯ p-axis at ¯ p = 1−b
b
θ(1−γ)
1+ν−θ (see equation (24).
In the Np <N R = ¯ N regime the resource constraint (18) is falling in
the (g,nP)-space. We see this from (18): more resources are needed when the
growth rate g is higher because there are more researchers, and when the share
of the products consumed by all consumers nP is higher (note that ∂¯ p/∂nP > 0).
The curve crosses the nP-axis at nRC
P which is implicitely deﬁned by (18) and
g =0 . But Lemma 4 above exactly states the conditions on the parameter
values such that ˜ nP <n RC
P < 1.
In the Np = NR = ¯ N regime the resource constraint is a linear function in
g and ¯ p. The intuition is that the ﬁrst order conditions of consumer optimiza-
tion suggest the expenditures on traditional goods to rise if ¯ p rises, thus more
resources are needed when ¯ p increases. Finally, as higher growth rate needs
26more researchers, we conclude that the resource constraint is a falling line in
the (g,¯ p)-space.
In the Np <N R < ¯ N regime the resource constraint (34) is a function
of the growth rate g and the waiting time δ since ˜ nP is given by the static
equilibrium condition. Looking at (34) we see directly that, if δ rises, less
resources in production of innovative and traditional goods are needed. If g
rises more researchers are needed. With δ kept ﬁxed resources needed in goods
production fall but under the condition of Lemma 3a. the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates:
higher g leads to an increase in needed resources. We conclude that the resource
constraint is a falling curve in the (g,δ)-space.
figure 2
Having discussed that shape of the zero proﬁt conditions and the resource
constraint we can now talk about the existence and uniqueness of the general
equilibrium in our model. We have seen that, if the hierarchy is ﬂat enough, the
zero-proﬁt condition is monotonic, and that the resource constraint is always
monotonic. This allows us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium).
a. If the hierarchy is ﬂat enough, so that the zero-proﬁt condition is mono-
tonic, and if the resource constraint crosses the nP-o r¯ p-axis to the right of the
zero proﬁt condition, there exists a unique general equilibrium with a positive
growth rate. If the resource constraint crosses the nP-o r¯ p-axis to the left of
the zero proﬁt condition, the unique equilibrium is stagnation.
b. If the hierarchy is ﬂat enough, so that the zero-proﬁt condition is mono-
tonic, both the regimes NP <N R = ¯ N and the regime NP <N R < ¯ N can
be equilibrium outcomes. The regime NP <N R < ¯ N can only arise, if the
hierarchy is steep enough.
7.3 Steeper Hierarchy









, i.e. when the zero
proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t” b e n d st ot h el e f t ”a tnz
P. Note ﬁrst, that the whole discussion
concerning the behavior of the resource constraint still holds because Lemma
1 was not needed there. Only the zero proﬁt constraint changes signiﬁcantly.




We have developed a model which allows us to discuss the eﬀects inequality
has on the demand structure and, in particular, on the demand for innovators.
27Thus, it is natural to ask how the growth rate g, the poors’ share nP/nR,and
the share of the traditional sector x are aﬀected if the inequality parameters β
and θ change.
8.1 No traditional sector (ν =0 )
To gain intuition, it is instructive to look at the baseline case where ν =0 , i.e.
no traditional sector exists. Note that in this case the regime NP = NR = ¯ N




is violated if ν =0(see Lemma 4). But the intuition is very clear indeed: If
NP = NR = ¯ N were an equilibrium, rich and poor would consume exactly the
same, since there is no expenditure for x-goods. This would imply that the
rich have income left causing their marginal utility of income be zero and thus
their marginal willingness to pay be inﬁnity. Hence it would be proﬁtable for
a monopolist to deviate, since he could raise proﬁt sb ys e l l i n go n l yt ot h er i c h .
We can state the following proposition
Proposition 6 If ν =0and hierarchy is ﬂat, the growth rate g increases and
the share of the poor nP/nR decreases if θ decreases or β increases.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition states that increases in inequality in the Lorenz-sense (as
captured by an increase in θ or a decrease in β) unambigously increase growth.
The intuition can be grasped by looking either at the allocation of labor or at
the resulting incentives for innovations.
With a higher θ the poor become relatively richer, thus their consumption
share increases, but this needs more labor in ﬁnal good production what means
that less researchers can be employed, this reduces growth. On the other hand,
if β increases there are less people in the economy who consume all goods,
hence more labor is left for research and growth rises. To get some intuition by
looking at the innovation incentives note that the research expenditures equal
proﬁts in this economy. Since higher inequality rises growth, as is suggested
by the proposition, it is equivalent to say that the proﬁt share increases with
inequality. But this simply means that the average markups are higher in this
economy. The reason is that monopolists may charge higher markups from the
rich and more product are sold at higher markups (since the consumption of the
poor falls). The lower markups on products which both buy cannot dominate
the ﬁrst two eﬀects.
8.2 The general case v>0
With v>0, we have to refer to simulations. However, we can draw general
conclusions for the now possible regime NP = NR = ¯ N.
Proposition 7 In the NP = NR = ¯ N regime a rise in θ, i.e. decreasing
inequality, unambigously increases growth. A change in β leaves the growth rate
unaﬀected.
28Proof. The equilibrium is characterized by equations (24) and (25). A rise
in θ decreases the right hand side of (24), hence higher growth for given ¯ p is
feasible (RC-curve shifts up). The parameter β does not appear in (24) and
(25).
Since the monopolists always sell to both groups, the prices they can set are
determined only by the marginal willingness to pay of the poor (θ increases), the
poor want to pay more whath allows the innovators to raise prices and increase
proﬁts. This increases in innovation incentive raises the growth rate. On the
other hand, a change in the groups size β can have no eﬀect on the growth.
With θ held constant the marginal willingness to pay of the relevant consumers
is unaﬀected and their innovation incentives remain the same.
In the Np <N R = ¯ N regime we have to refer to simulations. We got
the result, as can be seen from ﬁgure 4 below, that increases in θ (decreasing
inequality) always decreases growth, i.e. the result from the ν =0case still
holds. The ﬁgure shows further that for θ > 0.926 decreasing inequality raises
the growth rate, because for θ > 0.926 the NP = NR = ¯ N regime arises in
equilibrium.
figure 4
Instead, for some parameter constellations where inequality is not too high we
found that an increase in β (which increases inequality since θ is ﬁxed) decreases
the growth rate, an example is plotted in the second graph of ﬁgure 4. This is
an important result: For the demand structure ”higher inequality” is not always
the same. Changes in θ aﬀect the willingness to pay, whereas changes in β aﬀect
the market size. The simulation result now says that higher inequality due to
higher β has a negative eﬀect on growth. The reason is not the rise of inequality
itself, because a lower θ would rise both inequality and growth, but the smaller
market size 1 − β for the newest goods, sold only to the rich.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
The relationship between inequality and demand structure in an endogenous
growth model where consumers have non-homothetic preferences was explored.
Preliminarily, we repeat the main results. (i) Changes in inequality aﬀect the
aggregate price structure and there may be market exclusion of the poor due
to high prices. (ii) If there is exclusion, higher inequality tends to increase
growth because the proﬁt share increases. However, higher inequality due to a
bigger group of poor people may reduce growth. (iii) If the innovators always
sell to the whole population, inequality has an unambigously negative impact
on growth. Prices are then determined by the willingness to pay of the poor.
An even more egalitarian distribution allows the monopolist to set higher prices
and earn higher proﬁts as the poor are the ’critical’ consumers that determine
demand at the extensive margin.
2910 Appendix
10.1 The case NP <N R < N
10.1.1 Maximized static utilities and expenditures (NP <N R < N)
We have now an additional variable, δ = −1
g ln(NR/N) that says how long an
innovator has to wait until his product has positive demand. At the same time
the price of the good that has least priority among all goods that are acutally
sold, i.e. the price of good NR must equal the marginal cost, that is p(NR)=1 .
(If p(NR) > 1 it would be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm j>N R to start production since
the willingness to pay of the rich would be above marginal costs.) The prices of
the goods j>N R are not deﬁned. Using analogous arguments as in Section 3
(for the regime NP <N R = N), in the case when we have NP <N R < N it is

















j ∈ (NP,N R].
(26)
w h e r ew en o t et h a tn o wnP = NP(t)/N(t). The static equilibrium is then the
solution to the following six equations in the six unknowns nP,n R,x P,x R,λP
and λR. (note that NP(t)=nPe−δgN and NR(t)=e−δgN).

































































Again the ﬁrst two equations equate the willingnesses to pay to the respective
good with least priority for both types of consumers, the equations (R3) and
(R4) determine the equilibrium amount of the homogeneous good and the ﬁnal
two equations (R5) and (R6) say that the budget constraints have to be satisﬁed
for both types of consumers.
We proceed similarly as before and reduce this system to two equations in
the two unknowns nP and nR. Combining, respectively, equations (R1) and





















































and we note that both EP and N as well as ER and N are proportional.
Finally, we calculate the maximized static utilities in terms of the endogenous
variables nP and nR. Substituting the relations (27) and (28) into the utility
ﬂow function (2). This yields for the rich











and for the poor














From (7) and (8) we know that, for given values of nP and p,t h er a n g e
of available goods N and the expenditure levels Ei are proportional for both
types of consumers. Moreover, we will see in the next section that also N
px is a







Equation (11) gives the important result that instantaneous utility is of the
CRRA-type with hierarchy-parameter γ as the relevant parameter.17
17An important observation can be made here though the utilities of the rich and the
poor are CRRA in their expenditures over time, the ratio of utility between the poor and
the rich at a given point of time does not exhibit a CRRA relationship, even if v =0 ,i . e .
u(xR(t),nR(t))





in general. The reason is that the expenditure share of a single
good is not the same for the rich and the poor, they even do not consume the same goods.
Since prices of the various goods are diﬀerent, rich and poor face a diﬀerent average price
level.
3110.1.2 The resource constraint (NP <N R < N)
The resource constraint when NP <N R < N i sg i v e nb yt h es u mo fe m -
ployment in R&D LR, manufacturing of the diﬀerentiated hierarchical prod-
ucts LN; and production of the homogenous good Lx. Just like before, we
have again a level of R&D employment equal to LR = gF; a level of em-
ployment to produce output in the monopolistic sector given by LN =( 1−
β)e b(t)NR(t)+βe b(t)NP(t)=b
£
(1 − β)e−δg + βnP
¤
; and using (27) and (28), a
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2 + β(1 − β)n
−γ
P ]nP +( 1− β)e−δg¤
(34)
10.1.3 The zero-proﬁt condition (NP <N R < N)
In equilibrium we must have that the innovation cost equals the value of an
innovation. In the equilibrium where NP <N R < N no household can aﬀord
good N when the innovator incurs the ﬁx e dc o s ts ot h a tg o o dN is actually
available on the market. This means that innovator have a waiting time δ
during which nobody will buy the new product. At date t + δ, the waiting
time ends, and the rich consumers start to buy the good N(t) (which has been
invented at date t). From date t+δ until date t+δ+∆ only the rich can aﬀord
this good, as monopolists set prices equal to the willingness to pay of the rich.
But at date t+δ+∆ a l s ot h ep o o rh a v eas u ﬃciently high willingness to pay so
the monopolist will cut prices and charge the willingsness to pay of the poor, so
the monopolistic ﬁrm gets the entire market. The waiting time δ until the rich
start to buy consumers in the economy is given by NR(t+δ)=N(t) and using
the fact that both N(t) and NR(t) grow at the same rate, δ can be calculated
as δ = −(1/g)lnnR. Moreover, the additional waiting period ∆ until also the
poor buy (i.e. until it becomes proﬁtable to cut prices and sell to the entire
market) is given by ∆ = −(1/g)lnnP
nR.
By these arguments, we can calculate the zero-proﬁt condition in the case
Proceeding similarly as in the case NP <N R < N as (we proceed similarly as


























































w h e r ew eh a v ea g a i nu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition φ = r − gγ and the fact that from
(14)
10.1.4 The equilibrium conditions (NP <N R < N)
The general equilibrium consists of the following 3 equations in the 3 unknowns
nP, nR, and g: (i) the zero-proﬁt conditions, (ii) the resource constraint, and
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10.2 The case NP = NR = N
10.2.1 Maximized static utilities and expenditures (NP = NR = N)
Finally, it remains to describe the static equilibrium when we have a situation
where both types of consumers purchase all diﬀerentiated goods that are avail-
able on the market, the case NP = NR = N. There is one crucial diﬀerence
33to the former two cases: in both of those cases we had a situation such that
the good that has least priority for consumer i, Ni has a price that is equal to
consumer i’s willingness to pay for that good, qi(Ni). Now, as Ni is identical
for both types of consumers, we have a situation where the good that has least
priority for the rich, is priced at the willingness to pay for the poor. But this
means that we have a situation where the richs’ willingness to pay for good N
is higher than the price p. This is important as it implies that the rich spend
relatively more of their budget on the homogeneous good than they would if the
ﬁrm could get the willingness to pay from the rich. It terms of our equilibrium
equations, it implies that we have only ﬁve equations (plus one inequality) in











































Relations (Q1) and (Q2) say that the price of good N, p, is equal to the will-
ingness to pay of the poor, but lower than the willingness to pay of the rich.
The remaining equations are the conditions for the equilibrium quantities of
the homogeneous good xi ((Q3) and (Q4)) and the budget constraints for both
types of consumers ((Q5) and (Q6)).






and substituting this into into (Q5) yields the expenditure function for the poor







The expenditure function of the rich can now be easily expressed in terms of the
endogenous variables p and xR as From the budget constraint ER =
pN
1−γ +pxxR










The maximized static utility for the poor can be using that xP is given by
(35). Substituting this into the static utility (2) yields




















and substitute this into the utility function (2) to get















N are constants (which will be the case along the










10.2.2 The resource constraint (NP = NR = N)
T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti nt h ec a s ew h e nNP = NR = N is given by the
sum of employment in R&D LR, manufacturing of the diﬀerentiated hierar-
chical products LN; and production of the homogenous good Lx. Just like be-
fore, we have again a level of R&D employment equal to LR = gF; a level
of employment to produce output in the monopolistic sector given by LN =
(1 − β)e b(t)NR(t)+βe b(t)NP(t)=b; and using (35) and (??), a level of em-































w). Now we use EP
N = p1+ν









































(1−γ)θ. This yields e resource constraint is therefore given
by




3510.2.3 The zero-proﬁt condition (NP = NR = N)
In equilibrium we must have that the innovation cost equals the value of an
innovation. In the equilibrium where NP = NR = N all households buy all N
goods already from the point of time when the innovator incurs the ﬁxed cost
and enters the market. The price the ﬁrm charges equals the willingness to pay


















10.2.4 The equilibrium conditions (NP = NR = N)
When NP = NR = N the equilibrium conditions consist of two equations in the















(We observe that the ’third’ condition, relative budgets, is now redundant, as
nP = nR =1 .)
10.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We ﬁrst prove part b. and c. of the Lemma. To calculate the value of p where
Zc r o s s e st h eh o r i z o n t a la x i s ,w eh a v et os o l v et h ez e r op r o ﬁt condition for p
where g =0 .
Proof. In the NP <N R = N regime we get, using formula (16) and noting




(1 − β)(p − 1)e−ρ(s−t)ds =
1 − β
ρ
(p − 1) =
F
b
We solve for p and Lemma 3b. follows immediately.
Proof. In the NP = NR = N regime we use (E00a)) and get
1
ρ
(p − 1) =
F
b
Solving again for p yields Lemma 3c.
36Proof. We derive the value of an innovation in the NP <N R = N regime













g2 ΠR( ¯ N(t + ∆)) +
lnnP





(σ(1 − γ)+γ) − σ(1 − γ)[βn
γ
P +( 1− β)p]egγ(s−t)
i
e−r(s−t)(s − t)ds
Note ﬁrst that ΠR( ¯ N(t+∆)=Πtot( ¯ N(t+∆)).W eg i v eﬁrst a suﬃcient condition
for the second integral above has to be negative. The integral starts at t + ∆,
this implies that egγ(s−t) ≥ eg∆γ = n
−γ
P . We note that
h
(σ(1 − γ)+γ) − σ(1 − γ)[βn
γ
P +( 1− β)p]egγ(s−t)
i
≤ (σ(1 − γ)+γ) − σ(1 − γ)
£







P > p ≥ 1+
γ
σ(1−γ)(1−β). This condition also implies the ﬁrst integral
to be negative. We directly see that (σ(1 − γ)+γ) − σ(1 − γ)pegγ(s−t) ≤ 0 if
p ≥ 1+
γ
σ(1−γ), which is a weaker condition.
If ∂B
∂g < 0 the zero proﬁt condition has to be positively sloped. Together
w i t hL e m m a3 b .t h i si m p l i e st h a t¯ p ≥ 1+ 1
1−β
Fρ








σ(1 − γ)(1 − β)
If we solve this expression for γ, Lemma 3a. follows for the NP <N R =
N regime.
For the NP = NR = N regime the result is much easier to prove. In that







(σ(1 − γ)+γ) − σ(1 − γ)pegγ(s−t)
i
e−r(s−t)(s − t)ds
Using the same argument as above, the integral is negative if p ≥ 1+
γ
σ(1−γ).
Again, the zero proﬁt condition has a positive slope under the conditions of the
Lemma. From Lemma 3c. we hence note that p ≥ 1+
Fρ
b . Combining we get
the same ﬁnal condition and the same solution for γ as above.
10.4 Proof of Proposition 7
With ﬂat hierarchy the NP <N R = N regime is the only outcome in equilib-








37This implies directly that
∂¯ p
∂θ < 0 and
∂¯ p
∂β > 0.
How are the equilibrium curves deﬁned by (18) and (19) aﬀected? A rise
in θ does not aﬀect RC, since this parameter does not appear if ν =0 . A
rise in β, however, implies that less resources are needed, RC shifts up. To
discuss the shifts of Z note that Πtot(j)=[ βn
γ




















+ β. Using the formula for





. Hence, p(1 − β) falls in θ








∂β > 0. Obviously, the Z-curve shifts to the
right when θ increases and it shifts to left when β increases.
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Figure 4: Simulations 
 
Default values:   
θ  = 0.8, β  = 0.5, F = 5, b = 0.3, σ  = 2, ρ  = 0.02, γ  = 0.3, ν  = 0.8 
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